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THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE

by Ruti Teitel•

I. INTRODUCTION

The beginning of the modem moment is identified by at least one
philosopher in the response to the Lisbon earthquake in 1755 .1 Rather than
merely accepting the catastrophe as misfortune or fate, a new response
emerged: the disaster was characterized as "injustice," a failure of human,
not divine, intervention. In this about-face, the deadly consequences of the
Lisbon earthquake were seen as the result of a failure of human action; the
insecure architecture of the city's apartment buildings was the fault line to
blame.
A similar adoption of the language of justice characterized the
modem human rights movement, which commenced in the response to
World War II. This international response was noteworthy for its legal
character; it emphasized criminal accountability, its symbols the
International Military Tribunal and the Nuremberg proceedings. Indeed, the
ongoing legacy of the postwar response is evinced in the contemporary
moment. As we near the century's end, the recurring manifestations of the
call for the protection of international human rights are persistently and
overwhelmingly criminal in nature: the convening of the Hague Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 2 the entrenchment of the
Nuremberg-style International Criminal Court in the recent Rome
agreement,3 as well as the transnational proceedings initiated against General
Augusto Pinochet, the former Chilean dictator. 4 Contemporary responses to
tragic atrocities identify criminal accountability in the international legal
system with the rule oflaw.
This Article explores contemporary developments in international
human rights in analyzing the emergence of international criminal law as an
arch response to atrocity in the name of human rights. A critical question

•
l.
2.

3.
4.

Ernst C. Stiefel Professor of Comparative Law, New York Law School.
See Judith N. Shklar, The Faces oflnjustice 51-54 (1990).
See infra note 35.
See infra note 7.
See infra note 31.
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raised by this response is, what are the aims of international criminal law in
its advancement of human rights? Ifinternational criminal justice is intended
to protect human rights, to what extent is its role the accurate representation
of and retribution for past wrongs? Or is its role to transform societal
understandings in advancing the protection of human rights? And if the
latter, how exactly do criminal processes effect the liberal transformation of
transitional states emerging from authoritarian rule?
There appear to be two alternative normative paradigms advanced
by the use of international criminal law: "politics of universalism" and
"politics of difference." A universalistic politics drives the postwar
paradigm, in which both principles of jurisdiction and substantive criminal
law are shaped by a standard of "humanity." Challenging the historical
universalist paradigm is a more contemporary paradigm, which advances an
identity politics. In the politics of difference, international criminal law
moves beyond the conventional role of criminal justice of isolating
individual wrongdoing to emphasize the representation of individual victims
and their persecution on the basis of group affiliation. In contemporary
proceedings, international criminal law both affirms individual rights to
equal protection, and through its considerations of policy, also represents the
collective. As is elaborated more fully below, these alternative paradigms are
in some tension. This is apparent in how the purposes and role of
international criminal law mediate the universal and the particular.
Ultimately, contemporary attempts to model a coherent conception of
international criminal justice culminate in a chiefly limited process-based
conception of the rule of law.
What is international criminal law's potential for advancing human
rights? To what extent can the difficult project of transformation, of moving
to a more liberal politics, be accomplished through international criminal
processes? This Article explores various paradigms of international criminal
justice with an eye to a better understanding of the potential of criminal law
in the contemporary moment.
II. THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALISM
Consider the genealogy of modem human rights law. Historically,
international criminal institutions and processes have been dedicated to
representing the universal in human rights. As the prevailing scholarly
accounts suggest, the beginning of the modem international human rights
movement occurred in the postwar period, with the Universal Declaration of
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Human Rights following closely the establishment of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. 5 Moreover, these understandings of human
rights as universal share affinities with the constitutional developments that
accompanied the beginning of the international human rights movement. 6
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg has long been a
potent symbol of law's universality. The nature of the proceedings, the
substantive charges brought and adjudicated, in particular "crimes against
humanity" as defined in the Nuremberg Charter, and the subsequent trials all
embodied understandings of universal standards of humanity. 7 A central
5.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Aug. 8, 1945, art. 1, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284.
See Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights 16-17 (1990) (observing that human rights
6.
began appearing in constitutions during the postwar period and that "universalization" is
reflected in national constitutions).
7.
Compare Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of
War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, reprinted in 1
Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Court: A Step Toward World Peace 488
(1980), with Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 5, art. 6(c). Article
6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter defines "crimes against humanity" as
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the
war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 5, art. 6(c).
Article 7 of the recent Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court expands
the definition of "crimes against humanity":
[T]he following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c)
Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e)
Imprisonment ... ; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery ... ; (h)
Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender ... grounds ... ; (i)
Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; and (k)
Other inhumane acts of a similar character ....
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, art. 7, U.N. Doc.
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charge at Nuremberg was "crimes against humanity," proscribing inhumane
acts committed against civilians, whether or not in the context of the war. 8
Despite the enormity of the war, the Tribunal's normative legacy is one of
the core concepts of universal human dignity. 9
Though the commitment was to the advancement of "universal"
values, the natural law theory animating the postwar legal
responses-whether in their criminal or their constitutional form-was
tempered by the various legal and political traditions prevailing in the
postwar period. In part, the relevant traditions derived from the
circumstances of the Allied response to Nazi Germany. Accordingly, what
was deemed "universal" at the time was informed by Allied traditions and
by the explicit, critical response to repressive fascism. Accordingly, law's
response and its turn to the universal reflected the then-reigning view that
the perversion of Nazi rule derived from moral relativism implicit in that
regime's understanding oflegality. The repression of the Nazi regime was
associated with its putative positivist philosophy oflaw. 10 Accordingly, the
direct response to totalitarianism was the move to natural law concepts
implicated by the universal rights violations adjudicated in the international
proceedings that were convened. This conception of universal human rights
also reflected the ascendance of American rights traditions in postwar
occupied Europe. Both the then-emerging international human rights
movement and the wave of constitutionalism shared a common theory of
rights: rights conceptualized as traditional Anglo-American rights at law,
that is, rights as norms backed by sanctions. 11
On this account, the postwar procedures are best understood as
concretizing both a particular view of rights, a conception that was a product
of its times, and lhe belief in modernity and law. Postwar justice was
conceived of as a system ofjudicially enforced rights. Whereas traditionally
the predicate to enforceable rights was a functioning nation-state, however,
A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
8.
See generally Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (1992).
9.
See Ruti Teitel, Nuremberg and Its Legacy, Fifty Years Later, in War Crimes: The
Legacy of Nuremberg 44 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999).
10.
Though scholars of the period suggest thejudiciary's philosophy of law under the
Reich was considerably more complicated. See, e.g., Ingo Millier, Hitler's Justice: The
Courts of the Third Reich 68-81 (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1991); Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political
Transformation, 106 Yale L.J. 2009, 2025 & n.52 (1997).
11.
See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 218 (Clarendon Press 1994) (1961).
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the postwar responses exemplified the landmark uses of a new legal system
by internationalizing a traditional, domestic form of rights protection through
judicial processes. The modern international human rights regime sought to
construct human rights as universal by casting individual rights and
responsibilities in terms of universalizing human characteristics. The
adjudication of human rights violations in the "crimes against humanity"
proceedings in a manner that encompassed natural law understandings
demonstrates this phenomenon. 12
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the extent to which the
asserted universalist conception of human rights is animated by and
contingent upon its particular political context. Despite pretensions to
universality, the wartime political context had a pervasive and ongoing force;
it operated as a substantive restrictive principle, limiting the Tribunal's
jurisdiction. Thus, prosecutions in the Nuremberg proceedings were limited
to inhumane acts with a demonstrable nexus to war. 13 Even under the rubric
of universality, the understanding of human rights is limited in multiple
respects. For example, where "universal" offenses are adjudicated in the
domestic context, these adjudications are constrained by conventional
jurisdictional principles such as territoriality nationality.
The postwar conception of the judicialized human rights model
persists to the present day. That protection of human rights is still thought
to be attainable through international punishment processes shows the
continuing dominance of the postwar paradigm and its central symbols.
Nevertheless, such criminal proceedings have been few and far between,
despite numerous genocidal campaigns and the commission of other
atrocities in this century. The adjudication of genocide has largely been
limited to the Nuremberg trials 14 and the more contemporary atrocities
relating to the Balkans conflict. Indeed, the international proceedings that
were convened as a result of ethnic cleansing in Europe, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, was the first such effort since
the World War II-related trials. 15 The sporadic application of the Genocide

12.
See Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (2d ed. 1986).
13.
For a discussion of this prudential self-limiting in the scope of the postwar trials,
see Taylor, supra note 8, at 113-15.
14.
See Beth Van Schaack, The Crime ofPolitical Genocide: Repairing the Genocide
Convention's Blind Spot, 106 Yale L.J. 2259, 2259 (1997).
15.
See infra note 38.
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Convention 16 and the failure to adjudicate cases of political genocide 17 relate
to a distinctive postwar history. The general lack of rights enforcement by
means of criminal proceedings contributes to a pervasive sense that the
international human rights regime is flawed, even as it also suggests that the
judicial, procedural feature of the universal conception of rights retains
ongoing significance today.

Ill. THE MOVE TO POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
The move away from the notion of a unitary, universalizing
conception of human rights to a broader understanding that comprehends a
more complex understanding of identity began, paradoxically, with the Cold
War. The political realities of the period led to rights differentiation and the
attempt to draw distinctions among rights, in particular between political and
civil as opposed to economic and social rights. A debate emerged about the
meaning of''real" human rights, challenging the postwar rights model. The
debate reflected the existence of normative dissent not apparent at the
beginning of the human rights movement. The conflicts focused in particular
on the conception of the state and the extent of its commitments to and
agenda regarding economic security. Despite the assertion of the equivalence
of political and economic rights in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the rights divide was stark, as seen in bitter debates in the United
Nations, 18 as well as in the ultimate adoption of separate covenants to
enforce political and economic rights. 19 Moreover, the dominance of the
judicialized rights paradigm further obscured the comparability of these
rights. Rights differentiation challenged the prevailing rights model insofar
as the model had emphasized the protection, through judicial processes and
apparatuses, of political norms considered universal. This challenge to the
postwar rights model, raising issues of enforceability as well as the pwported
16.
See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
17.
See Van Schaack, supra note 11, at 2269-72.
18.
See generally Seminar on the Realization of Economi~ and Social Rights
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 5-13, U.N. Doc. STffAO/HR/31
(1967).
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
19.
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
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antinomy regarding so-called "positive" and ''negative" rights, went to the
very meaning of international human rights. Understandings of the
justiciability and enforcement of rights ordinarily associated with domestic
law played a significant role in defining rights on the international scene.20
Ultimately, an apparent rights hierarchy emerged, with a rights conception
considered so different from the first wave in the postwar period that it has
been readily understood to comprise another "generation" ofrights. 21
Contemporary adjudications of international human rights violations
in the courts show a more complex view of the second generation rights
model. These proceedings reflect a move away from the postwar search for
universal definitions and values to particularist human rights norms,
understandings that are linked to particular national contexts and political
conflicts. In a number of countries, the struggle over whether and how to
limit the application of the concept of "universality" in the postwar human
rights regime went hand in hand with related limiting jurisdictional
principles based on particularist notions of identity, such as nationality and
ethnicity. Whereas offenses at Nuremberg were prosecuted as "crimes
against humanity" on a universalizing basis, in the subsequent national trials
of the 1950s and 1960s these offenses were prosecuted in terms of the
collective. 22 This change was not necessarily embraced. 23
The shift to a particularized notion of rights marks a number of
deliberations over adjudicating the "crime against humanity" offense within
national jurisdictions throughout Europe. In the 1960s, a debate ensued in
Germany over whether, and in what fashion, to continue the World War 11related trials. Once again, this debate revealed the tension in international
criminal law between the universal and the particular, juxtaposing
universalizing ideas ofjurisdiction against more particular notions ofjustice

20.
See Maurice Cranston, What Are Human Rights? 84-85 (1962).
See Louis B. Sohn, The New International law: Protection of the Rights of
21.
Individuals Rather Than States, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. I, 32 (1982) (distinguishing the first
generation of rights, civil and political rights, from economic, social, and cultural rights,
which comprise the second generation).
22.
In Israel, for example, Eichmann was prosecuted for commission of "crime[s]
against the Jewish people." See Cr. C. (Jm.) 40/61 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann,
1961, reprinted in 56 Am. J. Int') L. 805 (1962).
23.
For example, for some scholars the representation in the trial of Adolf Eichmann
of a more contextualized account of the wartime atrocities as committed "against the Jewish
people" was incomplete. See, e.g., Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the
Banality ofEvil 275-76 (Penguin Books 1994) (1963).
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as resolved in national statutes of limitations. Ultimately, the wartime-era
trials were continued, but with significant limits. Indeed, the salient
restrictive principles included status--for example, nationality of the
parties-and motive. While jurisdictional principles are often considered
largely procedural, in the international arena these principles express critical
normative values; they illuminate the nature of the relation oflaw to politics
and help explicate what norms might transcend a state's transient political
consensus.
In another European trial for World War II-related atrocities, the
prosecution in France of Klaus Barbie in the late 1980s for wartime
deportations of civilians raised again the extent to which asserted universal
human rights are reconcilable with national traditions and legal cultures. In
the 1960s, France incorporated the Nuremberg definition of"crimes against
humanity" into its criminal law-a domestic, national law incorporation of
concepts of universality. 24 The incorporation of international standards into
national law had important ramifications. Applying the principle of universal
jurisdiction implied by wronging "humanity" created tension with
preexisting limiting principles of jurisdiction, and therefore necessitated
changing fundamental jurisdictional principles. For purposes of the "crime
against humanity," the twenty-year time limit that would ordinarily have
applied to all offenses in France, no matter how heinous, was tolled,
allowing the prosecution of Barbie for World War II offenses to go forward
in 1987. This case illustrates the extent to which prosecutions of war crimes,
even years after the fact, continue to be shaped by a state's particular legal
culture and the ambient political circumstances.
International jurisdiction offers a space for the representation of
human rights values. Adjudicating "crimes against humanity" implies
displacing the domestic law principles that would ordinarily constrain
prosecution and signals an attempt to denationalize and depoliticize, and
hence universalize, the relevant offenses. Yet, notwithstanding the passage
of time, depoliticizing the prosecution of wartime crimes of the Vichy
regime proved difficult. Despite the attempt to reconcile universal criminal
justice within a national regime, crimes are adjudicated within the
parameters of a distinct political context, jurisdiction, and related principles.
While the adjudication of "crimes against humanity" historically implied
features of normative universalism, its treatment in the Barbie trial in
contemporary France ultimately represented ano~her politics-identity
24.

See C. Pen., arts. 211-1, 212-1 (Fr.).
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politics. 2s Political differences over the trial emerged in a partisan debate in
France, the broad contours of which were historical. The controversy
centered around the meaning of "crimes against humanity" as incorporated
in French law: namely, whether the prosecution of crimes against humanity
could go beyond the atrocities committed against "innocent Jews" to include
those committed against members of the Resistance. 26 In its review, France's
High Court moved beyond the status-based conceptualization of protected
classes to a more complex understanding of the scope of the "humanity"
crime, focusing not on the victims' status but on the perpetrators' motives
in behavior against the backdrop of state policy.27 Yet when policy
predominated, leading to expansion of the humanity charge to include crimes
against members of the Resistance, the move appeared politically motivated
and was controversial in the country, opening a debate about the subjects of
the humanity crime. 28 The national cases adjudicating "crimes against
humanity" reinterpreted the term's meaning in the context of the changing
rights regime.
The emergence of a third generation of rights, rights that
comprehend collectives and ethnicity rights, marks the more recent
developments. 29 Conferring the imprimatur of international law on
communities defined along ethnic and religious lines challenged the hitherto
normative emphasis on the universal in human rights. The move from
considerations of status to those of individual action ultimately refocuses
attention on policy, linking the individual to the collective.

25.
See Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of
Klaus Barbie, 98 Yale L.J. 1321, 1381 (1989).
26.
See Federation Nationale des Deportes et Intemes Resistants et Patriotes and
Others v. Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 125, 139-40 (Fr., Cass. crim., Dec. 20, 1985).
Id.
27.
28.
See Alain Finkielkraut, Remembering in Vain: The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes
Against Humanity 19-20 (Roxanne Lapidus & Sima Godfrey trans., Columbia Univ. Press
1992).
29.
See Sohn, supra note 21, at 48.
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IV. HUMAN RIGHTS GLOBALIZATION
In the contemporary moment, international human rights norms have
"gone global"; their protection is envisioned as somehow autonomous, no
longer bounded by international institutions or even the affected nationstates. Contemporary instantiations of international criminal justice seem to
operate independent of conventional connections such as territoriality,
effects, or nationality, whether of offender or victim. 30 The expansion
beyond these traditional bases for jurisdiction suggests new directions for
normative principles for assuming jurisdiction. On their face, rights norms
appear to be developed in an unsystematic manner. Jurisdiction is often
taken or assumed by states with apparently remote connections to the
underlying controversy, in the name of human rights.
Accordingly, the contemporary emergence of rights globalization is
highlighted not only by the ad hoc international tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but also by occasional national cases, such as
Spain's extradition request of General Pinochet for human rights violations
perpetrated in Chile under military rule. 31 In addition, Germany indicted
Dusko Tadic for commission of war crimes in the Balkans prior to turning
him over to the International Tribunal.32 The assumption of jurisdiction on
the basis of "crimes against humanity" jurisdiction appears to constitute an
act of solidarity. Normative instantiation, in the name of human rights, is
being promoted independent of the affected states, in the name of global rule
of law and justice. The contemporary globalization of rights enforcement,
albeit in sporadic adjudications, challenges both the immediate postwar
emphasis on international institutions as well as more particularist, local
understandings of justice.

30.
There are traditional jurisdictional principles that connect states to criminal
prosecution. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States§ 402
( 1987). The Comment to section 402 provides that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe Jaw
under general principles of: (l) territoriality; (2) nationality; (3) effects within the territory;
(4) protection of the state's security; (5) passive personality. Id. cmts. a-g.
See In Re Pinochet, Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment in the Cause
31.
(Jan. 15, 1999) (visited Feb. 6, 1999) <http://www.parliament.the-stationeryoff... pa/Id l 99899/ldjudgmt/jd990115/pinoO l.htm>.
32.
See The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic alkla "Du/e," Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion
and Judgment, pt. 1.8., iii! 6-9 (May 7, 1997) (visited May 11, 1999) <http://www.un.org/
icty/tadic/trialc2/jugement-e/970507jt.htm>.
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Human rights globalization through international criminal law
enforcement suggests a profound change in the sources, content, and form
of rights norms. 33 The enforcement of international human rights norms
through judicial proceedings that occur outside the traditional spaces of
contestation vividly demonstrates this change. To some extent, these
adjudications signal the universal in human rights, but they also generate
complex issues as the concept of universality interacts with the legal
traditions and political agreements of particular countries, pointing to a
changing relationship among law, politics, and justice in the international
arena.
Globalization has paradoxical ramifications for international
criminal justice. In some sense, it implies closer connections between
countries' criminal justice systems, as reflected in the adoption of
conventions and extradition treaties that facilitate transnational cooperation.
At the same time, there is a change in traditional understandings of
sovereignty with respect to its relation to law. As the bounds of traditional
sovereignty are penetrated, expansion of criminal jurisdiction would appear
to follow. Yet globalization also implies other contemporary changes that
point in another direction: toward the breakdown in conventional ideas of
causation, agency, and relatedly, individual responsibility. 34 Systematic
repression implies more than individual responsibility; indeed, at the level
of the collective and the regime, it often implies that more than one regime
is responsible. Although jurisdiction over international human rights
violations may well be expanded as a theoretical matter, its application is
stressed by other developments. The principle of individual responsibility at
the core of postwar international criminal justice cannot adequately take
account of systematic repression. Accordingly, globalization in rights
enforcement puts great pressure on the postwar judicial rights model,
spurring the further elaboration of various restrictive principles, which
delimit the potential for the construction of human rights in and through the
criminal law.

33.
Similar developments are seen in the globalization of the civil sanctions
instantiating human rights law. See Proposals ofthe Hague Conference and their Effect on
Efforts to Enforce International Human Rights Through Adjudication (submitted by Int'I
Assoc. of Democratic Lawyers), in Work Doc. No. 117, Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Nov. 13, 1998.
See Samuel Schemer, Individual Responsibility in a Global Age, in Contemporary
34.
Political and Social Philosophy 219, 228-29 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1995).
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V. MEDIATING THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

Consider the role of international criminal justice in responding to
the grave political violence that has characterized much of the twentieth
century. International criminal justice is thought to have a normative role in
responding to illiberal identity politics-law is thought the apt response to
communal violence and disorder. International criminal justice's normative
potential is evident in the ongoing trials at the Hague, where criminal justice
is being used both to respond to "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans and
Rwanda and to reconcile the conflicts in these areas. The new international
criminal law statutes, whether the ad hoc codifications being applied in the
Hague Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda35 or the statute for
the proposed permanent International Criminal Court,36 involve various
constructs that attempt to bridge the universal and the particular in identity
politics.
With respect to the Balkans, the goal of the tribunal was profoundly
ambitious: to move from communal conflict to establish peace and the rule
of law,37 whereby punishment under the law would hold individuals

35.
Statute of the International Tribunal [for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations oflntemational Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia], Annex to Report ofthe Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. for Apr.-June
1993, at 134-38, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda [for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States], Annex to S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute].
See Rome Statute, supra note 7.
36.
37.
The Security Council's decision to establish the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (later expanded to include Rwanda) was motivated not only by an intent
to punish and to prosecute, see Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) 'lf'lf 3-4, Annex to Letter Dated 24 May
1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/674 (1994) [hereinafter Final Report], but also as a measure to bring about peace.
See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), 48th Sess., Supp. for Apr.-June 1993, '1!'1110, 22, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(1993); S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(1993). This use of judicial proceedings to bring about peace had no precedent in the
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responsible in an effort to limit' private vengeance. When a U.N.
Commission of Experts found that there was a campaign of "ethnic
cleansing,"38 the expectation was that international criminal law would
establish individual accountability to break supposed cycles of ethnic
retribution. In the words of the Tribunal's prosecutor, "[a]bsolving nations
of collective guilt through the attribution of individual responsibility is an
essential means of countering the misinformation and indoctrination which
breeds ethnic and religious hatred."39 To that end, crimes against humanity
were defined to encompass widespread and systematic inhumane acts
"directed against any civilian population" including "persecutions on
political, racial and religious grounds. ,.40 Where intent to destroy "a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group" could be shown, persecution was also
prosecutable as "genocide."41
The international proceedings at the Hague raised the question of
whether the tribunals were up to the task of constructing a norm responsive
to ethnic persecution. Universalist ideas were extended far beyond the
postwar consensus. Thus, crimes against humanity-whether or not
committed in the course of international armed conflict-were prosecuted
independent of state lines. This was most vividly demonstrated in the
adjudication of the attempted genocide of approximately one million Tutsi
and Hutu moderates in Rwanda. The persecution was committed entirely in
that country's internal conflict, and yet these crimes were adjudicated in an
international forurn. 42 In these proceedings, universalist norms appear to
have transcended traditional limits on adjudicating international offenses.
In their conventional role, the strength of criminal proceedings is
that they bring out the significance of individual action, which advances
principles of liberalism. The criminal law's focus on individual
responsibility represents an important liberal principle: the significance of

postwar paradigm.
38.
See Annex IV, The Policy ofEthnic Cleansing 17, 21-36, in Annexes to the Final
Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
780 (1992), Vol. I, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2(Vol.I)/Annex IV (1994).
39.
See Response to the Motion of the Defence on the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal at
23, (filed July 7, 1995), The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a "Dute," Case No. IT-94-IT.
40.
See ICTY Statute, supra note 35, art. 5.
41.
See id. art. 4,, 2. See also Final Report, supra note 37,, 182 (concluding that the
actions perpetrated in Op~na Prijedor against non-Serbs would likely be confinned in court
as constituting genocide).
42.
See ICTR Statute, supra note 35.
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agency and responsibility. Nevertheless, such emphasis on ascribing
individual accountability in war crimes trials is of questionable value
because individual proceedings ultimately obscure the profound role of
systemic policy in repression. Because of their emphasis on individual
accountability and because they are ''bottom up," contemporary war crimes
trials show a notable evasion of politics. Accordingly, international and
global adjudications ultimately obscure the significance of systemic
persecution. For example, since the construct of a crime against humanity
highlights the universal in the offense, when persecution is adjudicated at the
Hague Tribunal as an offense against the entire international community, it
is construed in a profoundly apolitical way. Further, where the proceedings
are convened in a political vacuum, apparently independent of traditional
national jurisdictions, the criminal proceedings obscure the significance of
state policies and other structural causes behind these crimes. 43 In
contemporary international criminal law, the constructs of "genocide" and
"crimes against humanity" incorporate highly nuanced understandings ofthe
individual and the collective. By their very definitions, these offenses link
the individual and the collective. Offenses against groups incorporate a
conception of cultural and ethnic identity into the definition of the offense,
and individuals are prosecuted for committing such offenses. Thus, for
example, the contemporary trials at the ad hoc tribunals at the Hague take
note of ethnicity through principles that emphasize persecutory motive, if
only to transcend it.
These contemporary criminal constructs raise again the question
posed earlier in this Article of what our intuitions are regarding the
appropriate purposes of international criminal law. To what extent do we
expect it to simply represent past wrongdoing; or to what extent is it
intended to be transformative of that past wrongdoing? In this regard,
contemporary human rights proceedings risk emphasizing ethno-conscious
elements of persecution that, to some extent, would affirm, and perhaps even
in some small way reenact, past persecution.44 The normative change in the
rule of law is thought to be a twofold symbol of equality of protection: that

43.
On structural causes see Robert W. Gordon, Undoing Historical Injustice, in
Justice and Injustice in Law and Legal Theory 35 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams eds.,
1996).
44.
For discussion of the performative in legal responses, see Judith Butler, Excitable
Speech: A Politics of the Performative 43-44 (1997).
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is, of equal application of the law both to perpetrators and to victims-and
hence all citizens in the society.
Nevertheless, the universal and the particular are somehow in
tension here. While new law affirms and seemingly protects individual
rights, the motive principle plays a restrictive role, limiting the reach of the
offense as against humanity and sharply constraining the application of
international law. This results from the often crushing burden of proof,
making prosecution difficult. Moreover, the insistence on proof of individual
motive can be misleading, as it obscures the extent to which persecutory
policy is a social and above all political construct. The parameters of this
potentially universalizing construct undermine the possibility of adequately
representing the extent to which the architecture of genocide is political.45
VI. MILLENNIAL VISIONS: JUSTICE INTO THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY

In light of the above constraints, the question remains: what is the
potential for international criminal justice in human rights? In some sense
the use of criminal law to enforce human rights is a millennial vision,
reaffirmed by the contemporary consensus on establishing a new
international institution, the permanent International Criminal Court. The
permanent International Criminal Court appears to entrench the postwar
tribunal for the end of the century and the next millennium. Yet going
beyond the construct at Nuremberg, the statute for the International Criminal
Court reveals the dynamic tension discussed here between the politics of
universalism and identity politics in international criminal justice.46
In the contemporary International Criminal Court, the role of
international criminal justice is complex. At mid-century, the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg articulated an understanding of the rule of
law reflecting the consensus of a small number of nation-states. Indeed, at
the time, convening the International Military Tribunal was rationalized by
the unavailability in occupied Europe of the ordinary nation-state rule oflaw
regime. There was a lack of both sovereignty as it is conventionally
understood and working judicial institutions. Whereas in the new global
order, the traditional bases for jurisdiction have given way to an expansive,
normative agenda. As previously discussed, the expansion of offenses for

45.
46.

See generally Van Schaack, supra note 14.
Rome Statute, supra note 7.
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which jurisdiction is "universal" points to a similar expansion of
transnational consensus. The charter for the new International Criminal
Court extends the reach of international criminal law; there is a pronounced
move from objective approaches to jurisdiction to more subjective, policybased principles. This is explicit in the expansion of the definition of"crimes
against humanity,'"'7 and the use of international criminal law both to
construct international human rights violations and to represent identity
politics. Thus, for example, the new codifications reflect the change afoot in
the social and legal construction of rights and rights violations. The tum to
international criminal law to protect a pluralist identity politics is evident in
the transformation of what counts as "persecution." The Rome Statute
includes persecution on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
or gender grounds as a crime against humanity. 48 In addition to establishing
identities, the Rome Statute's codification of "crimes against humanity"
encompasses crimes of the apartheid regime as well as the repressive policies
of military juntas in Latin America and Africa, 49 an eloquent recognition of
profound contemporary political change.
This change is also seen in the Rome Statute's heightened protection
of women from sexual violence, with the codification of rape as a crime at
several places in the statute. 5 For example, the U.N. Expert's Report
investigating rape and sexual assault in the former Yugoslavia concluded
that several different avenues for prosecution were available to address the
crime of rape or other sexual assaults. 51 The definitional requirements of
additional material elements, in particular concerning intentionality, create
different categories of war crimes. This raises the question of what
difference it makes in how the perpetrators of these atrocities are prosecuted;
does the resolution of this question depend upon the perceived purpose or
purposes of international criminal law? The new codifications allow for

°

47.
See id. art. 7.
48.
See id. art. 7, '11 l(h).
49.
Enforced disappearances and apartheid are now codified as "crimes against
humanity." See id. art. 7, 'll'll l(i), l(j).
SO.
"Crimes against humanity" includes "[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, ... or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity." Id. art.
7, 'II l(g). Under the statute, rape is also a war crime, see id. art. 8, 'If 2(b)(xxii), and
potentially a form of genocide. See id. art. 6(b)-(d). See infra notes 51-53.
51.
See Annex II, Rape and Sexual Assault: A legal Study 3, 5-9, in Annexes to the
Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), Vol. I, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2(Vol.I)/Annex II (1994).
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alternative adjudications of wrongdoing: rape can be prosecuted as a "war
crime";s2 as a "crime against humanity";s3 or as "genocide."s4 Where rape
is prosecuted as a "war crime," the offense constitutes a limit on the waging
of war. Where rape is prosecuted as a "crime against humanity," it
emphasizes that at war or peace women are part of "humanity." Where rape
is prosecuted as "genocide," it emphasizes the intersectionality of genderbased violence with ethnic-based violence and shows how rape can serve as
an instrumentality for group destruction.ss Ultimately, the availability of
alternative adjudications necessitates asking once again, what is the purpose
of international criminal justice? Is it the role of prosecutions to best
represent past wrongdoing, or is its role to transform the past understandings
so as to protect future human rights?
Developments in human rights dating back to the postwar period
affirm the notion that there is a growing normative consensus in the
expansion of "crimes against humanity." Though punishment may well be
ex post and occasional, even this largely symbolic condemnation expresses
a sense of international accord. Many of these offenses had already been
recognized as human rights violations at customary law, the most heinous
known as jus cogens.s 6 There is consensus on these most grave rights
offenses, and hence universal jurisdiction. Under the new international rights
regime, these offenses have been codified and ratified as conventional law,
adding democratic-based legitimacy. For the first time since the immediate
postwar period, there are renewed expectations of a shared international
normative consensus.
Contemporary developments suggest that international criminal law
stands in fragile equipoise, its purposes hanging in the balance. Tension
between the expression of the universal and particular is evident in

52.
See Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 8,, 2(b)(xxii).
See id. art. 7,, l(g). See also The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No.
53.
ICTR-96-4-T, pt. 7.7 (visited Feb. 1, 1999) <http://www.un.org/ictr/english/judgements/
akayesu.htrnl>.
See Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 6(b)-(d).
54.
55.
See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, pt. 7.8.
See Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the Sources oflntemational Law, 47 Brit.
56.
Y.8. Int'! L. 273, 281-82 (1974-75); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53,
opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)
(definingjus cogens as peremptory norm). For a discussion of these "peremptory norms from
which no derogation by treaty is permitted," see Oscar Schachter, International Law in
Theory and Practice 342-45 (1991).
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contemporary institutional and statutory developments. Despite lofty
universalizing goals of representation of racial, ethnic, and genderized
violence, the danger is that the original construction is reaffirmed by the
remedy, the equivocal representation of an illiberal politics. 57 The risk in
adjudicating the discrimination-based offense, of emphasizing the racial or
ethnic in the offense, is that rights adjudication could reaffirm rabid and
unchanging identity politics. Such criminal proceedings would backfire,
affirming only the perverse and conservative message of an illiberal state.
Illiberal identity politics should be exposed for what it is: a political and
social construction.
Accordingly, the new International Criminal Court, established to
normalize international criminal justice at the century's end by using the law
to respond to atrocities, ultimately raises the recurring question of what is the
purpose and role of international criminal law in human rights. Undoubtedly,
there is the message, albeit a thin one, of an isolated, discrete adherence to
a procedural rule of law. Yet the global human rights regime constitutes a
paradoxical normative order. Insofar as it attempts to represent an
autonomous norm, free of national and political predicates, it is vulnerable.
The sad history of the twentieth century reveals that the protection of human
rights is most at risk when it lacks a legal and political matrix of a rule of law
state. But the irony is that clearly making this point necessitates the rule-oflaw institutions of the working nation-state. Where there is no critical
account ofrepressive illiberal identity politics, international criminal law can
hardly serve to reconcile conflicts, nor to express the essential liberal
message of transformation.

57.

See generally Butler, supra note 44.
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VII. CONCLUSION
How to respond to grave injustice? If the modern moment begins
with a change in the understanding of the potential ofhuman intervention in
recognizing avertible tragedy, the postmodern moment implies recognition
of the limits and contingency in its exercise. Yet, historically and in its more
contemporary renaissance, international criminal law appears to have a role
to play. The globalization of criminal law, though occasional and erratic, has
a normative force. Wherever states adjudicate crimes against humanity or
other universal offenses, these instantiations represent a consensus upon a
rights-based limit on persecutory politics. Nevertheless, this largely symbolic
and ex post normative order is lacking, removed from national contexts and
thicker political constructs, international criminal processes offer only
glimmerings of a transcendent rule oflaw. The resonance of this particular
legal response in the contemporary moment derives from its potential to span
universalist and particularist human rights values. Its transformative potential
is in moving beyond notions of enduring ethnic conflict to express that what
is at stake in the recurring and pervasive communal violence of this century
are conflicts that are largely politically constructed, and, therefore, hopefully
amenable to change.

